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Philosophical Essays Against Open Theism, edited by Benjamin H. Arbour.
Routledge, 2019. Pp. vii + 217. $140 (hardback).
GREGORY E. GANSSLE, Talbot School of Theology
This book brings together eleven essays critical of various features of
open theism. It begins with a helpful introduction by the editor. Arbour
explains that “what unites all open theists is the affirmation that the future
is epistemically open for God” (7, italics in original). As a result, God does
not have definite knowledge of the future. Important differences within
open theism can be found in whether propositions concerning future contingents have truth values or not. Some hold that they do, but God cannot know them. God is limited in his knowledge. Others reject the idea
that propositions concerning future contingents have truth values. On this
view, God knows all truths. Within each of these views, of course, there
are nuances. Some who hold that propositions concerning future contingents have truth values also hold that all such propositions that use terms
such as “will” or “will not” are false. Others reject bivalence concerning
these propositions. This section of the introduction provides a clear structure to categorize the variety of arguments in this area.
The book is divided into three sections. The first part, “Open Theism
and the Metaphysics of Time,” includes three essays. Eleonore Stump
leads off with “The Openness of God: Eternity and Free Will” in which
she clarifies and applies the traditional understanding of God’s eternality.
The fact that God has eternal knowledge of a person’s free choice (which
occurs at some time) does not render that choice any less contingent than
it would be on open theism. She writes: “On the doctrine of eternity, the
logical dependence of God’s knowledge on the events known does not rule
out the causal dependence of those events on God’s acts, and those acts
are included in God’s knowledge” (34). This essay is followed by Sandra
Visser’s “God’s Knowledge of an Unreal Future.” She argues that, given
presentism, the best view of God’s knowledge will be some kind of compatibilism or “an open theism that is very constrained indeed” (43). The
constraints involve the fact that God chose to create creatures such that
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their free choices were open. Thus, propositions describing these choices
have no truth value until the choices are made. In choosing to create in this
way, God chooses to limit his knowledge in light of his other aims. Given
this view, “God will have to know enough about the future so that he can
be sure that nothing will go irredeemably wrong” (42). The third essay
is Benjamin Arbour’s “A Few Worries about the Systematic Metaphysics
of Open Future Open Theism.” Arbour argues that if Open Future Open
Theism is true, there is no actual world. A possible world is often taken to
be a complete history of that world. Any world with an open future has
no complete history. The concrete universe, on open theism, has no complete history. Thus, the concrete universe is not the actual world. Arbour
concludes that Open Future Open Theism requires a significant revision
of our modal concepts.
The second part, “Open Theism and Other Philosophical Issues,” includes David Alexander’s “Open Theism and Origins Essentialism: A
New Argument Against Open Theism.” Alexander argues that Origins
Essentialism holds that the causal history of an event is essential to it. Suppose there is some future event that God can know. If the causal history
of that object includes the free actions of creatures, then those free actions
also can be known by God. Furthermore, God can know them even when
they are future to God. Paul Helm, in “The ‘Openness’ in Compatibilism,”
argues that “compatibilism can furnish us with all the openness we need”
(84). This openness is not due to the metaphysical indeterminacy of future free actions, for they are not indeterminate. Rather, it is due to their
epistemic indeterminacy. Katherin A. Rogers’s “Foreknowledge, Freedom,
and Vicious Circles: Anselm vs. Open Theism,” continues her project of
explicating and defending Anselmian theism. She engages David Hunt’s
worries over explanatory loops in various views of divine foreknowledge.
An explanatory loop occurs when God’s decisions at a time influence
what occurs in the future, but what occurs in the future shapes his decisions. There must be some explanatory loops, she argues, because of
divine prophecy. The key is to show that such loops are not vicious. On
Anselm’s view, God is the primary cause of all things. Thus, “if the problem of vicious circularity has to do with explaining how and why things
exist, then I believe that vicious circularity is avoided” (107, emphasis in
original). Robert B. Stewart’s argument in “On Open Theism Either God
Has False Beliefs, or I Can Know Something that God Cannot” is exactly
as the title suggests. Stewart claims that he can know that his wife will
love him tomorrow, despite the fact that this fact is the result of a future
free action. That he knows this fact is clear from any reasonable analysis
of knowledge. He believes his wife will love him. It is true, and he has
sufficient justification. God, however, cannot form the belief that Stewart’s
wife will love him because there are possible worlds in which it turns out
to be false. If it is possible that God have a false belief, then he is not essentially omniscient.
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The final section, “Open Theism and Other Issues in Philosophical
Theology,” opens with “‘May It Have Happened, Lord!’: Open Theism
and Past-Directed Prayers” by James N. Anderson. Anderson argues that
prayers for the past are legitimate as long as the one praying does not
know how the event in question turned out. These past directed prayers
can be answered by God only if God knows that the prayers will occur,
and he knows this fact in time to answer them. Anderson uses the example
of praying for a friend’s interview after the interview took place. If God
knows the future free act of praying, he can answer the prayer by shaping
how the interview goes. If God cannot know future free action, he cannot
answer such prayers. This essay, if I may offer a brief personal digression, was greatly encouraging to me. The week I read it, one of the friends
that frequented the homeless ministry of our church died of an overdose.
Although a member of our church had had several conversations about
the gospel with Lucas, we do not know if he responded. I found myself
praying with renewed confidence that he will have responded to God’s
gracious offer.
The final three papers take up various issues concerning the problem
of evil. First is Greg Welty, “Open Theism, Risk-Taking, and the Problem
of Evil.” Welty argues that various alleged advantages of open theism regarding the problem of evil actually do not amount to much. This conclusion undermines some of the major motivation many have for embracing
openness. Next, Ken Perszyk, in “Open Theism and the Soteriological
Problem of Evil,” discusses the particular challenges of those who do not
hear the good news in this life and of eternal judgment. As far as hell is
concerned, he argues that the open view has serious challenges. It is reckless for God to create people when he does not know their destiny. Some
thinkers are happy to adopt some form of universalism as a result. The
open theist fares no better on universalism, if that view is taken to involve
the free response of creatures. God cannot know that anyone will freely
respond to his grace, let alone that everyone will. Keith Wyma, in “Jesus
Didn’t Die for Your Sins: Open Theism, Atonement, and the Pastoral
Problem of Evil,” argues that on the openness view God does not know
what human beings will be actual in the relatively distant future. Thus,
at the time of the death of Jesus, he did not know that we would exist. If
he did not know that we will exist, how can he have made his sacrifice for
each of us? At best, Jesus died for whatever human beings would exist.
This view minimizes the resources of the gospel for the pastoral problem
of evil. There is little comfort for a person in the midst of suffering in the
view that Jesus loved and died for people in general, but did not even
know her. When I am suffering, I need a sense that God knows me and
had me in mind in his sacrifice. The open theist cannot deliver this basic
comfort.
Although each essay warrants deeper critical engagement, I wish to
comment in more detail on two in particular. David Alexander’s “Open
Theism and Origins Essentialism: A New Argument Against Open
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Theism,” as the title claims, does present a new argument. Starting from
the claim that God can know of a future determined event, Alexander argues that God will be able to know some future free actions. Alexander
begins with what Jonathan Kvanvig has called the “Asymmetry Thesis.”
The asymmetry is that propositions describing future events that are determined by the past or present have determinate truth value while those
not determined do not. The next assumption in the argument is Origins
Essentialism. For any event, items in the casual ancestry of that event are
essential to it. Alexander states his argument as follows:
1. There is some future event F determined by the past and present, and
God knows F.
2. For any event E, the causal ancestry of E is essential to the identity of E.
3. If something x is essential to the identity of something else y, then y implies x.
4. Hence, the identity of E implies the causal ancestry of E.
5. If God knows E, then God knows whatever E implies.
6. Hence, God knows whatever F implies.
7. There are future free actions in the causal ancestry of F.
8. Hence, God knows future free actions. (76)

The first premise is complex. It is really the conjunct of three claims. The
first claim is that, if a proposition is true, God knows it. The second is, as
Alexander mentions, the first part of the asymmetry thesis. Future events
that are determined have a determinate truth value. The third is that there
is at least one event of this kind. None of these conjuncts is especially
problematic. From premises 1 through 6, the argument unfolds without a
hitch. Once we get to premise 7, however, there is room for the open theist
to object. This statement, she will protest, is incompatible with 1. If there
are future free actions in the causal ancestry of an event, that event is not
determined. This objection is a matter of the nature of libertarian freedom.
Any event that is causally downstream from a libertarian free choice is
itself undetermined. The argument, although interesting, turns out to beg
the question. No open theist will be concerned about it.
Another essay that deserves comment is Greg Welty’s chapter, “Open
Theism, Risk-Taking, and the Problem of Evil.” The problem of evil is one
of the main issues that motivates open theism. In light of this fact, Welty
compares what he calls “risk-free” views of providence with “risk-taking”
views in light of how they face the problem of evil. Risk-free views include
theological determinism and Molinism. Risk-taking views include open
theism and incremental simple foreknowledge. Four aspects of the problem of evil are dealt with in turn. They are: gratuitous evil, meticulous
providence, moral motivation, and the morality of risk-taking. In each of
these areas, Welty argues that open theism has no advantage over risk
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free accounts of providence. Welty’s treatment of these issues is thoughtprovoking. I can give only the highlights here.
The open theist holds that God allows gratuitous evil because God does
not know which particular evils will result from human freedom. God allows these kinds of evils to happen because libertarian freedom is a great
good. But God does not have a specific reason to allow each specific case
of an evil choice. Welty argues that God’s general policy of not interfering with evils may be justified by the great good of freedom. For each
case of evil, however, one can ask if “God’s following his general policy
of nonintervention in this case was necessary to maximize opportunities
for great goods” (143, emphasis in original). What requires a justifying
reason, then, is the application of the general policy in any particular case.
As a result, Welty argues that no evil turns out to be actually gratuitous.
God refrains from interfering only if he has a justifying reason to follow
his general policy rather than to suspend it.
Meticulous providence is the claim that every event that occurs does so
only because God ordains that it occurs. Welty employs the term “meticulish providence” in which every event that occurs does so because God
made a deliberate choice to permit it to occur. Open theism holds that
God’s providence is meticulish, but not meticulous. Welty observes that
even on meticulish providence, God can choose to intervene in time to
prevent all evils. I have referred to the possibility of God’s timely intervention as the “heart attack” objection. In 1939, for example, God had learned
enough about the likely results of the present trends in Nazi Germany
to intervene in indiscernible ways to give Hitler a heart attack. That he
did not do so was because, in Welty’s words, “he makes the call that the
risk of permitting the choice outweighs the bad effects of intervention”
(147–148). Thus, open theism is in the same situation as meticulous views
of providence.
Welty turns to a third alleged advantage of open theism. Some open
theists allege that if God executes meticulous providence, then he allows
each event because the world will be better if he does so. If I am contemplating whether to act to prevent a particular evil that I can prevent, I get
stopped in my tracks. If I do not prevent the evil, the world will be better.
Surely, it would be wrong of me to intervene. Welty offers a quick and decisive response. The open theist, he thinks, ignores another truth that is an
implication of meticulous providence. Not only is it the case that the world
will be better if I do not prevent the evil, it is also true that the world will be
better if I do prevent the evil. God’s meticulous providence guarantees that
he will bring good out of whatever choices we make. It does not ground
the following judgment: If I do not prevent the evil, the world will be better than it would be if I do prevent it. Given that we are commanded to intervene to help our neighbors, we have all the moral motivation we need.
Finally, Welty turns his attention to whether risky providence itself is
justified. Here he argues not that open theism does not fare better than
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risk-free versions of providence, but that it does worse. One central issue
concerning the morality of risk is how the risk is distributed among those
involved in the event. Welty points out that whatever the risks are that
God takes, he does not suffer from them the way human beings often do.
Welty asks a series of questions such as, “Will [God] perish due to lack of
food, water, shelter, and good health? No.” This one question is enough
to see that for all the talk of God’s risks, on open theism, it is the creatures that are most vulnerable. There is at least a prima facie case that God
is more morally responsible if he adopts risky providence by creating a
world with an open future than if he maintains a risk-free providence.
Welty’s essay is simply excellent. His treatment of these themes is very
careful. He draws on the writings of open theists as he lays out the details
of the four relevant aspects of the problem of evil. In addition, he raises
relevant objections to his assessments and answers them. This chapter will
provide impetus for continued work for years to come.
In a short review, I can do no more than gesture at the contents of this
book. Many of the essays warrant a deeper look. The collection as a whole
has several strengths that are worth mentioning. First, the papers vary
widely in topic and in philosophical perspective. They range over several
metaphysical issues as well as issues more central to philosophical theology. The collection demonstrates that issues related to divine foreknowledge touch a wider variety of the different fields within philosophy than
might be expected. The authors also vary in their philosophical commitments. Some are compatibilists and some are libertarians. Some are atemporalists and some hold that God is temporal. This diversity strengthens
the collection. Third, the quality of each essay is very good. Both open
theists and critics of open theism will find much to think about. I highly
recommend this work.

Petitionary Prayer: A Philosophical Investigation, by Scott Davison. Oxford
University Press, 2017. Pp. vi + 189. $75.00 (hardcover).
KATE FINLEY, Hope College
Scott Davison orients his investigation of petitionary prayer around the
following pair of questions: “Assuming that the God of traditional theism
exists, is it reasonable to think that God answers specific petitionary
prayers? Or are those prayers pointless in the sense that they do not influence God’s action?” (7–8). Davison begins by admitting that he originally planned to argue that the answers to those questions are no and yes,

pp. 390–395

FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY Vol. 36 No. 3 July 2019
doi: 10.5840/faithphil2019363126
All rights reserved

